No. 79209-7

SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

GENE CHAMPAGNE, CARY BROWN, ROLAND KNORR, and CHRISTOPHER SCANLON, Petitioners,

٧.

THURSTON COUNTY, Respondent.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF PETITIONERS— CHAMPAGNE, ET AL.

Will Aitchison, WSBA #32658
Aitchison & Vick, Inc.
3021 NE Broadway
Portland, OR 97232
(503) 282-6160

Attorney for Petitioners Champagne, 7
Brown, Knorr, and Scanlon

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Portland, OR 97232 (503) 282-6160 Fax: (503) 282-5877

I. INTRODUCTION

At the heart of this case is whether employees in the State of Washington have a remedy when an employer deprives them of the use of the wages they have earned. The Court of Appeals for Division II has opined that there is no such remedy so long as the wages are eventually paid. The Petitioners respectfully disagree and ask this Court to overturn that decision.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. <u>First Assignment of Error</u>: The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Washington law does not provide a statutory remedy for an employer's failure to pay overtime wages in accordance with the time period specified in WAC 296-128-035. The Court of Appeals further erred in concluding that WAC 296-128-035 applies only to violations of minimum wage laws under RCW 49.46 and monetary damages are limited to circumstances in which an employer fails to pay statutory minimum wages.

Second Assignment of Error: While the opinion of the Court of Appeals expressed no position on the issue, the trial court granted Thurston County's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that wage and hour claims are subject to Washington's Tort Claims Act, RCW 4.96.010 and 4.96.020, and the requirements in RCW 36.45.010. As the notice provisions in the Tort Claims Act do not apply to statutory

2 error.

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This lawsuit was brought by several corrections officers, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals. (Complaint, CP 3-4). The corrections officers contended that their employer, Thurston County, unlawfully delayed the payment of overtime. (Complaint, CP 5-7). Specifically, the corrections officers asserted that the County's practice of withholding the wage payments at issue for up to two months violates WAC 296-128-035. (Complaint, CP 6).

claims that do not sound in tort, the trial court's conclusions were in

The trial court granted summary judgment to the County because the corrections officers had not filed a tort claim notice with the County prior to filing the lawsuit. (CP 282-83). The corrections officers appealed the trial court's decision, arguing that their lawsuit against the County was a statutory claim, not a tort or contract claim. (CP 295-98).

The Court of Appeals Division II upheld the grant of summary judgment on different grounds. (Appendix to Brief of Appellant, A-5 to A-6). The Court held that employees have a remedy under Washington's wage-and-hour laws only where an employer has paid "no compensation" to an employee. (Appendix to Brief of Appellant, A-4). Because the employees in this case eventually received their wages, the

Court concluded they had no claim under the law. (Appendix to Brief of Appellant, A-5).

IV. ARGUMENT

The linchpin of the Court of Appeals' decision is the Court's belief that an employer can deprive its employees of the use of wages they have earned without any consequences to the employer or remedy for the employees, so long as the wages are eventually paid. The Court's interpretation provides employers with interest-free use of funds that belong to employees, and it encourages employers to delay payments indefinitely, or at least until their employees file a lawsuit. The Court's decision that employees have no remedy for delayed payments contravenes Washington's wage-and-hour laws and longstanding public policy.

The Legislature "evidenced a strong policy in favor of payment of wages due employees by enacting a comprehensive scheme to ensure payment of wages." *Schilling v. Radio Holdings, Inc.*, 136 Wn.2d 152, 157, 961 P.2d 371 (1998). This Court has repeatedly held that remedial wage-and-hour statutes should be "liberally construed to advance the Legislature's intent to protect employee wages and assure payment." *See, e.g., id.* at 159 (expansive interpretation of "willfully" withholding wages under RCW 49.52.050); *International Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. City of Everett*, 146 Wn.2d 29, 35, 42 P.3d 1265 (2002) (expansive interpretation of "action" and "person" in RCW 49.48.030). *See also*

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Gaglidari v. Denny's Rests., Inc., 117 Wn.2d 426, 450, 815 P.2d 1362 (1991) (expansive interpretation of "wages or salary owed" in RCW 49.48.030). In light of the strong policy of ensuring wage payment and this Court's expansive interpretations of wage-and-hour statutes, the Court of Appeals' decision should be overturned.

A. Washington's Wage-and-Hour Laws Provide a Remedy for the Delayed Payment of Wages.

Washington's wage-and-hour statutes and the interpreting regulations of the Department of Labor and Industries (DLI) do provide a remedy for the delayed payment of wages. In WAC 296-128-035, the DLI mandated that "all wages due shall be paid at no longer than monthly intervals to each employee on established regular pay days."

Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' decision, an employer is required to pay all of the wages due its employees within the designated time frame.²

¹ WAC 296-128-035 has been amended since the filing of this lawsuit. The quotation is from the regulation as it existed at the time the lawsuit was filed. The amended regulation has not substantively changed this provision. The amended sentence reads: "An employer shall pay all wages owed to an employee on an established regular pay day at no longer than monthly payment intervals."

² Such intent could not be more evident. The DLI has published the time-of-payment requirements in three separate regulations. *Compare* WAC 296-128-035 with WAC 296-126-023 and WAC 296-131-010.

When a violation of the regulation is established, the Minimum Wage Act (MWA), RCW 49.46, the Wage Payment Act (WPA), RCW 49.48, and the Wage Rebate Act (WRA), RCW 49.52, provide for civil enforcement remedies. *See Wingert v. Yellow Freight Systs., Inc.*, 146 Wn.2d 841, 848-50, 50 P.3d 256 (2002).

RCW 49.46.090 of the MWA provides for monetary damages if an employer "pays any employee less than wages to which such employee is entitled under or by virtue of this chapter." WAC 296-128-035, which was implemented under or by virtue of the MWA, specifies time-of-payment requirements for *all* wages. As a result, the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the employees in this case were not entitled to a remedy for the delayed wage payments that are at issue in this case.

Although WAC 296-128-035 was specifically promulgated by the DLI under the authority of the MWA, this time-of-payment regulation is also enforceable under the WPA and the WRA. *See Wingert*, 146 Wn.2d at 848 (holding that the employer's violation of a regulation promulgated under the Industrial Welfare Act with regard to rest breaks could be enforced through RCW 49.52.070 of the WRA). The WPA provides a remedy of back wages and attorney's fees if an employer

³ Among the substantive amendments to WAC 296-128-035, the DLI has specified time frames for the payment of "overtime wages," which indicates that the DLI interprets the term "wages" expansively.

"withhold[s] or divert[s] any portion of an employee's wages." RCW 49.48.030.⁴ The WRA provides a remedy of double the "wages unlawfully rebated or withheld" if the employer acts willfully. RCW 49.52.070.

RCW 49.52.070 is to be "liberally construed to advance the Legislature's intent to protect employee wages and assure payment."

Schilling, 136 Wn.2d at 159 (citing Brandt v. Impero, 1 Wn. App. 678, 682, 463 P.2d 197 (1969)). Nothing in WAC 296-128-035 or the WMA, the WPA, or the WRA supports the Court of Appeals' distinction between nonpayment and delayed payment. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' decision, damages must be available in both situations to assure that employers pay their employees as the Legislature intended.

The wage-and-hour statutes do not create a "safe harbor" period that allows employers to escape liability if they pay wages after they are due. Employers violate the statutes by paying a lower wage than is due to an employee. For the employer's obligation to have any meaning, the wages must be paid by a designated pay date, a date which is supplied by WAC 296-128-035. The interpretation of the Court of Appeals would make the time-of-payment regulation superfluous, and courts must

⁴ The DLI has been given concurrent administrative enforcement powers for claims under the WPA. *See* RCW 49.48.040-.070.

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"construe a statute so that no portion is rendered meaningless or superfluous." See Lewis v. State, Dep't of Licensing, 125 Wn. App. 666, 678, 105 P.3d 1029 (2005). For these reasons, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Washington's wage-and-hour statutes and the interpreting regulations do not provide a remedy for the delayed payment of wages.

The Court of Appeals also erred when it limited the application of WAC 296-128-035 to minimum wage violations, holding that the regulation does not apply to the WPA or the WRA. This interpretation directly contradicts the plain language of WAC 296-128-035 because the regulation specifically applies to "all wages due." The significance of the term "all" has been recognized by this Court before. Wingert, 146 Wn.2d at 848 (noting that WAC 296-126-092(4) did not distinguish

violations.

Should this Court find that WAC 296-128-035 is not explicitly enforceable through the WPA or the WRA, it should nonetheless construe the statutes in a fashion that creates a remedy for the delayed payment of wages. Only such a remedy will give full force and effect to

between regular hours and overtime hours because it used the inclusive

term "all"). Similarly, WAC 296-128-035 does not distinguish between

"all" to describe the wages. As a result, the Court of Appeals also erred

when it limited the application of WAC 296-128-035 to minimum wage

minimum wages and other wages, but instead uses the inclusive term

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| | Washington's wage-and-hour laws. If the Court of Appeals' |
| | interpretation of WAC 296-128-035 were upheld, employers in effect |
| | would only be required to pay the minimum wage. Employers could |
| | withhold all other wages indefinitely because there would be no |
| | statutory time frame for payment. As a result, employees would not hav |
| | a cause of action to recover any unpaid wages over the minimum wage |
| | because there would be no time at which the employer was statutorily |
| | obligated to pay the wages. Thus, employees would be left unprotected |
| | and subject to the employer's whim for payment of their non-minimum |
| | wages. This result directly contravenes the statutory scheme enacted by |
| | the Legislature, which demonstrates a strong commitment to ensuring |
| / | that employees are paid. Schilling, 136 Wash.2d at 157. |
| | Analogously, federal courts have inferred a time-of-payment |
| | requirement for the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The FLSA, like |

Analogously, federal courts have inferred a time-of-payment requirement for the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The FLSA, like Washington's MWA, has no provision that specifically requires the payment of wages in a particular time frame. Also like Washington's MWA, the FLSA requires that "no employer shall employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee *receives* compensation for his employment" at the prescribed rate. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (emphasis added). While the FLSA does not explicitly require timely payment of wages, the mandate that employees "receive" compensation necessarily implies that they receive compensation by a particular day. Accordingly, courts have construed

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| the FLSA to provide a remedy for both nonpayment and delayed | |
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| payment of wages under the FLSA. See, e.g., Biggs v. Wilson, 1 F.3 | d |
| 1537, 1542-43 (9th Cir. 1993). In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit held that | |
| "wages are 'unpaid' unless they are paid on the employees' regular | |
| payday." Id. at 1538 (finding a violation of the FLSA where the sta | te |
| paid employees two weeks after the regular pay day). See also Broo | oks v. |
| Village of Ridgefield Park, 185 F.3d 130, 136-37 (3d Cir. 1999) (fin | ıding |
| violation where compensation paid six weeks after regular pay day) | ; |
| Atlantic Co. v. Broughton, 146 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1944) (oblig | ation |
| to pay liquidated damages "immediately arises" when "an employe | r on |
| any regular payment date fails to pay the full amount due"). The sar | ne |
| solution should be adopted for Washington's wage-and-hour laws i | f this |
| Court finds that the statutes explicitly provide remedies for nonpays | nent |
| only. | |
| In sum, the civil enforcement provisions of the MWA, the WI | γA, |
| and the WRA provide remedies when wage payments are delayed in | 1 |
| violation of WAC 296-128-035. At the very least, a timely payment | |
| requirement should be inferred into the MWA to ensure that employ | yees |
| receive their wages as the Legislature intended. | |
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B. Consequence-Free Delayed Payment of Wages Contravenes Washington's Wage-and-Hour Policy.

When interpreting statutes, the Court will avoid an interpretation that leads to an absurd result. *Anderson v. State Dept. of Corrections*, 159 Wn.2d 849, 864, 154 P.3d 220 (2007). The Court of Appeals' interpretation does lead to such a result by providing an incentive for employers to delay the payment of wages indefinitely, or at least until their employees file suit.

Taken to its logical conclusion, the Court of Appeals' decision means that an employer can indefinitely delay paying its employees the wages that the employees have earned. The employer could then put those funds to a use that benefits the employer. For example, the employer could use the funds to purchase goods and services, or it could place the funds into an account that earns interest for the employer. Under the Court of Appeals' decision, as long as the employer pays the wages before the employees obtain a judgment, the employer escapes any liability to the employees for the delay. The employer would not even be required to pay interest, even though that is the generally accepted method of compensating another for the use of his money.

In effect, then, employers could finance their operation on the backs of their workers, a result that flies in the face of Washington's "long and proud history of being a pioneer in the protection of employee rights." *International Ass'n of Fire Fighters*, 146 Wn.2d at 35. Such a

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22 23 result is antithetical to Washington's "strong policy in favor of payment of wages due employees." Schilling, 136 Wn.2d at 157.

Providing a remedy solely for complete nonpayment of wages will encourage some employers to delay payment until the employees incur the costs of hiring an attorney and filing suit. At that point, according to the Court of Appeals' interpretation, the employer could pay the employees and thereby eliminate the cause of action.

The possibility that the employer could eliminate the cause of action by paying employees after a lawsuit is filed directly contradicts the Legislature's intent in enacting Washington's wage and hour laws. In enacting RCW 49.52.070, the Legislature provided employees with a mechanism for recovering litigation costs and attorney's fees, even where the action involves a small amount of wages. See Schilling, 136 Wash.2d at 159. This provision of costs and attorney's fees demonstrates the Legislature's commitment to the correct payment of wages. Yet, if the employer's delayed payment eliminated the cause of action, the employees could not recover litigation costs and attorney's fees, thereby hindering their ability to enforce the statute as the Legislature intended. The Court of Appeals' decision failed to accomplish the goal of statutory interpretation, which is to "ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent and purpose." In re Parentage of J.M.K., 155 Wn.2d 374, 387, 119 P.3d 840 (2005) (citing Am. Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Steen, 151 Wn.2d 512, 518, 91 P.3d 864 (2004)).

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Moreover, an employer would be able to avoid the criminal sanctions in RCW 49.52.050 simply by paying the employee before the case went to trial. Thus, the Court of Appeals' decision enables employers to escape the consequences of their criminal actions by giving back what they wrongfully took. This result is analogous to letting shoplifters avoid criminal penalties as long as they give back what they stole when they get caught.

C. The Tort Claims Act Does Not Apply to Statutory Wage-and-Hour Claims.

The trial court erred in holding that the employees were required to file a notice of claim with the County before filing this statutory wage-and-hour lawsuit. This is true because RCW 4.96, commonly referred to as the Tort Claims Act, applies to common law tort and contract claims, but not statutory causes of action.

In enacting the Tort Claims Act, the Legislature waived sovereign immunity "to discourage tortious governmental conduct, and to hold government responsible for its acts." Haberman v. Washington Public Power Supply Syst., 109 Wn.2d 107, 160, 744 P.2d 1032 (1987) (emphasis added). Division Three recently extended the claim-filing requirements of RCW 4.96 to common law breach of contract claims. Harberd v. City of Kettle Falls, 120 Wn. App. 498, 510, 84 P.3d 1241 (2004). Prior to the trial court's ruling in this case, the Tort Claims

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Act's requirements have never been held to encompass anything other than common law tort and contract claims.

While the Tort Claims Act presents perhaps the most commonly cited waiver of sovereign immunity, the Legislature can also waive sovereign immunity by enacting a statute that provides for a private right of action against governmental entities. See Wilson v. City of Seattle, 122 Wn.2d 814, 823-24, 863 P.2d 1336 (1993). Where the Legislature has waived sovereign immunity by this second method, the Tort Claims Act no longer applies. See id. at 820 (stating that the Tort Claims Act does not apply to "special statutory remedies").

Since the Legislature has opted to waive sovereign immunity in different ways, the reference to claims in RCW 36.45.010 and the Tort Claims Act is not as broad as the County asserts. 5 If a claim against the State is not authorized by the Tort Claims Act, and does not otherwise sound in tort or contract, but is instead authorized by another act of the Legislature, the statutory cause of action is subject to a claim-

⁵ Other language in the Tort Claims Act supports the interpretation that the Act's requirements only apply to claims sounding in tort. See RCW 4.96.020(2) (requiring appointment of agent to receive claims for "damages made under this chapter") (emphasis added); RCW 4.96.020(3) (prescribing content of notice of claim "for damages arising out of tortious conduct") (emphasis added); RCW 4.96.020(4) (providing for a 60-day waiting period after filing a notice of claim "for damages arising out of tortious 22 conduct") (emphasis added).

filing requirement only if the underlying statute requires this. *Wilson*, 122 Wn.2d at 824 (holding that the claim-filing requirements of RCW 4.96 did not apply to a statutory cause of action under RCW 64.40.020).

The claims in this lawsuit are not predicated upon the waiver of immunity in RCW 4.96 for tort claims. The claims are also not based on a contract. Instead, the employee's claims are brought under Washington's separate and distinct wage-and-hour statutory scheme. The MWA, the WPA, and the WRA themselves constitute the Legislature's waiver of sovereign immunity because the statutes extend their coverage to governmental employers. See Chelan County Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Chelan County, 45 Wn. App. 812, 815-16, 725 P.2d 1001 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 109 Wn.2d 282, 745 P.2d 1 (1987) (applying the MWA to County employees based on the definitions in RCW 49.46.010); RCW 49.48.115 (expressly including governmental employers in the definition of "employer" for the WPA); RCW 49.52.050 (expressly including public officials in the definition

⁶ The employees do not contend that the County has breached a contract of employment (the collective bargaining agreement). The employees rely solely on the

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of "employer" for the WRA). The employees in this case do not rely on the Tort Claims Act for the Legislature's waiver of sovereign immunity because each of the wage-and-hour statutes that are the basis for this lawsuit independently apply to governmental employers.

The claim-filing requirements of the Tort Claims Act do not apply because an employee bringing a wage-and-hour claim against his governmental employer need not look to the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the Tort Claims Act. Any procedural limitations would be contained in the wage-and-hour statutes themselves, and none of these statutes contain a claim-filing process. For these reasons, the trial court erred in dismissing the claims for failure to file a notice of claim with the County.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals' interpretation of the wage-and-hour statutes and the related time-of-payment regulation strips workers of protections that mandate timely payment of the wages that they earn. The Court's decision marks a regression in Washington's strong tradition of ensuring that employees receive fair compensation for their work. For the

rights given to them under WAC 296-128-035 and the statutory enforcement provisions in the MWA, the WPA, and the WRA.

| 1 | foregoing reasons, Petitioners respectfully request that this Court | | | |
|----|---|--|--|--|
| 2 | overturn the Court of Appeals' decision. | | | |
| 3 | DATED this 20th day of August, 2007. | | | |
| 4 | Respectfully submitted, | | | |
| 5 | Will Aitchison WSBA #32658 | | | |
| 6 | Hillary McClure, WSBA #31852 | | | |
| 7 | Aitchison & Vick 3021 NE Broadway | | | |
| 8 | Portland, OR 97224 (503) 282-6160 | | | |
| 9 | Attorneys for the Appellants | | | |
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

| GENE CHAMPAGNE, CARY BROWN, ROLAND KNORR, and CHRISTOPHER SCANLON, |) Court of Appeals No. 34039-9-II)) Thurston County No. 04-2-01990-4 |
|--|--|
| Petitioners, |)) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE |
| v. |) |
| THURSTON COUNTY, |) |
| Respondent. |)) , |
| |) |

I hereby declare under penalty of perjury according to the laws of the State of Washington that on this date I have caused a true and correct copy of Supplemental Brief of Petitioners—Champagne, et al. to be served via messenger on the following:

- Jeffrey G. Fancher Thurston County 2424 Evergreen Park Drive SW Suite 102 Olympia, WA 98502-6041
- Douglas E. Smith Littler Mendelson, PC 701 Fifth Avenue Suite 6500 Seattle, WA 98104-7097

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 1

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Aitchison & Vick, Inc. 5701 6th Ave. S., Suite 491A Seattle, WA 98108 (206) 957-0926 Fax: (206) 762-2418

. 23

Michael B. King
 Talmadge Law Group PLLC
 18010 Southcenter Parkway
 Tukwila, WA 98188-4630

Executed in Seattle, Washington this 20th day of August, 2007.

Jennie Gaston